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1 | “Håb for en løsning i Syrien” – Michel Kilo | “Some Hope for a Solution in Syria” – Michel Kilo |
2 | (Alle links er på engelsk, medmindre andet er angivet) Som en del af vores samarbejde med Syria Deeply udgiver vi en serie af artikler fra civile stemmer fanget i krydsilden samt perspektiverne på konflikten fra skribenter over hele verden. | As part of our collaboration with Syria Deeply we are cross-posting a series of articles that capture civilian voices caught in the crossfire, along with perspectives on the conflict from writers around the world. |
3 | Michel Kilo er en af Syriens berømte systemkritikere og politisk modstander til præsident Bashar Al Assad. | Michel Kilo is one of Syria's famous dissidents, a political opponent of President Bashar Al Assad. |
4 | Han indtog en fremtrædende plads i “Damaskus' Forår”, en kort blomstring af politisk frihed og udtryk i 2000. | He rose to prominence inthe Damascus Spring, a brief flourishing of political freedom and expression in 2000. |
5 | Kilo forlod Syrien 8 måneder inde i revolutionen og lever nu i Paris med sin familie. | Kilo left Syria eight months into the revolution and now lives in Paris with his family. |
6 | Han svarede på spørgsmål fra Syria Deeply via Skype. | He answered questions from Syria Deeply via Skype. |
7 | For mere af hans historie er her et link til et video interview om hans tid i fængslet - et resultat af hans kritiske røst. | For more on his story we've included a link to a video interview about his time in prison, jailed for his prominent political dissent. |
8 | SD: Står du officielt bag ved den syriske nationale koalition? | SD: Are you officially backing the Syrian National Coalition? |
9 | Hvad ser du som deres styrker og svagheder? | What do you see as their strengths and weaknesses? |
10 | Kilo: Jeg er ikke medlem af den syriske nationale koalition, fordi jeg mener, dens svaghed består i den overdrevne repræsentation af den islamiske bevægelse. | Kilo: I'm not a member of the Syrian National Coalition, because I think its weakness lies in the exaggerated representation of the Islamic movement. |
11 | Den repræsenterer ikke oppositionens andre kræfter, specielt de der taler for demokrati og sekularisme. | It does not represent the various trends of the opposition forces, especially democracy and secularism. |
12 | SD: Når du betragter krigens tilstand i Syrien, hvad ser du så? | SD: When you look at the state of the war in Syria, what do you see? |
13 | Michael Kilo | Michael Kilo |
14 | Kilo: I see a slow shift in the power relations between the opposition and the regime, with a possibility of many surprise twists. | Kilo: I see a slow shift in the power relations between the opposition and the regime, with a possibility of many surprise twists. |
15 | That includes desperate operations [by the Assad regime], such as the use of internationally banned weapons, as it loses control of more Syrian land. | |
16 | Fighting has also arrived in Damascus, encircling the main centers of power. Kilo: Jeg ser et langsomt skift i magtbalancen mellem oppositionen og regimet med en mulighed for mange overraskende drejninger. | That includes desperate operations [by the Assad regime], such as the use of internationally banned weapons, as it loses control of more Syrian land. |
17 | Det inkluderer desperate operationer [af Assads regime], såsom brugen af internationalt forbudte våben, mens det mister kontrol af syrisk land. | |
18 | Kampene har også nået Damaskus og indkredser magtens hovedcentre. | Fighting has also arrived in Damascus, encircling the main centers of power. |
19 | SD: Nærer du noget håb for en forhandlet løsning? | SD: Do you have any hope for a negotiated solution? |
20 | Hvad er det bedst tænkelige scenarie? | What is the best-case scenario? |
21 | Kilo: Ja. Jeg nærer et lille håb for en forhandlet løsning. | Kilo: Yes, I have some limited hope of a negotiated solution. |
22 | Nogle af systemets medlemmer har distanceret dem selv fra Assads regime og har forlænget deres forsoning til oppositionen og derved accepteret et skift til et demokratisk system. | Some members of the system have disassociated themselves from the Assad regime and extended their reconciliation to the opposition, accepting a transition to a democratic system. |
23 | SD: Hvordan forhindrer man sunnier [da] og alawister [da] i at bekæmpe hinanden? | SD: How do you keep Sunnis and Alawites from fighting each other? |
24 | Er der en måde? | Is there any way? |
25 | Et håb? | Any hope? |
26 | Kilo: Jeg ved ikke, hvordan vi kan forhindre sekteriske sammenstød uden et nationalt program der inddrager alle parter. | Kilo: I do not know how we can prevent sectarian clashes without a national program that brings in all parties. |
27 | Dette integrerede program eksisterer ikke i dag, siden oppositionen er gået glip af muligheden for at udforme og implementere det [tidligt i forløbet]. | This integrated program does not exist today, since the opposition had missed the opportunity of drafting and implementing it [early on]. |
28 | I dag tror jeg, vi har brug for et program, der vil opfordre alle til at samarbejde i et fælles nationalt projekt for at afskære ruten til en sekterisk konflikt eller i det mindste reducere chancen for en sådans begyndelse. | Today I think we need a kind of program, that will encourage everyone to collaborate in a joint national project, in order to cut the route to a sectarian conflict or at least reduces the possibility [of it erupting]. |
29 | SD: Er der medlemmer af det nuværende system, du mener kunne og burde blive i et fremtidigt Syrien? | SD: Are there members of the current system that you think could and should stay on in a future Syria? |
30 | Kilo: Ja. Der er mennesker i systemet, der kan spille en rolle i Syriens fremtid…nogle af de der nu har magten, specielt de der er afhoppet fra magten og Assads familie for at slutte sig til folket. | Kilo: Yes, there are people in the system who can play a role in the future of Syria…some of those who are now in power, especially those who are defecting from power and Assad's family to join the people. |
31 | SD: Hvad hæmmer i dag Assads regime? | SD: What is holding up the Assad regime today? |
32 | Kilo: Modstandskraften hos Assads militære styrke kommer fra russisk, kinesisk og iransk støtte og manglen på vestlig modstand. | Kilo: The resilience of Assad's military strength comes from Russian, Chinese, and Iranian support and the lack of a critical western position against it. |
33 | Det gør det muligt for dem at spille den støttende rolle uden virkelige hindringer, med grønt lys der tillader Assad at undertrykke folket og ødelægge Syrien. | That enables them to play that supporting role without real impediment, with a green light that allows Assad to oppress people and destroy Syria. |
34 | SD: Tror du Assads regime virkelig ville gøre brug af kemiske våben for dets politiske overlevelse? | SD: Do you think the Assad regime would really use chemical weapons for its political survival? |
35 | Kilo: Ja, der er ingen tvivl om at han ville bruge alle slags våben, også kemiske, for han respekterer ikke menneskers liv og rettigheder. | Kilo: Yes, there is no doubt that he would use all kinds of weapons, including chemical weapons, because he does not respect the lives and rights of human beings. |
36 | Ellers ville han ikke have ødelagt sit land. | Otherwise he wouldn't have destroyed his country. |
37 | SD: Hvordan tror du, Assad vil forlade billedet? | SD: How do you think Assad will exit the picture? |
38 | Kilo: Min frygt er, at vi vil bevæge os fra en krise med at styrte regimet til en ny krise, forlængelse af borgerkrigen og kaos, politisk og bevæbnet. | Kilo: My fear is that we will move from a crisis to overthrow the regime to a new crisis, extending civil war and chaos, political and armed. |
39 | Og vi bør ikke glemme, at Syrien er ødelagt og mange af folkene er hjemløse, sultende eller fordrevne og denne atmosfære vil understøtte kaos. | Plus, we shouldn't forget that Syria is destroyed, and much of the people are homeless, hungry, or displaced, and this atmosphere will encourage chaos. |
40 | SD: Hvad er din største frygt med hensyn til den kommende fase i Syrien? | SD: What is your biggest fear in the coming phase in Syria? |
41 | Kilo: Assad ønsker en afgørende sejr over sit folk. Dette er målet i den krig, der er blevet udkæmpet i næsten to år. | Kilo: Assad wants to make a decisive victory over his people, this is the goal of the war waged since nearly two years ago. |
42 | Den udelukker enhver for for politisk løsning, der er blevet tilbudt af oppositionen. | It excludes all kinds of political solutions that had been offered by the opposition. |
43 | Han tror stadig, han kan vinde krigen. | He fancies that he can still win the war. |
44 | SD: Hvad skal det internationale samfund gøre for Syrien? | SD: What does the international community need to do for Syria? |
45 | Kilo: Det internationale samfund bør udvikle en klar, praktisk og gældende stilling til at stoppe mordene i Syrien og arbejde på en politisk løsning af krisen uden tøven. | Kilo: The international community should develop clear, practical and applicable positions to stop the killing in Syria and work on a political solution to the crisis without hesitation. |
46 | [Verdensmagten] har demonstreret deres manglende evne til at gøre noget, og derved opgive deres ansvar med en svag opposition og et delt syrisk samfund som undskyldning. | [World powers] have demonstrated their inability to do anything, abandoning their responsibilities under the pretext of a weak opposition and divided Syrian society. |
47 | SD: Hvis du kunne bede Amerikas præsident Obama om at ændre noget ved politikken i forhold til Syrien, hvad ville det være? | SD: If you could tell US President Obama to make one change on Syria policy, what would it be? |
48 | Kilo: Jeg ville samstemmende med, hvad jeg har sagt gentagne gange, fortælle ham, at USAs politik må være baseret på respekt for menneskerettigheder alle steder. | Kilo: I'll tell him committed to what I said repeatedly, that U.S. policy must be based on respect for human rights for people, everywhere. |
49 | SD: Bør det internationale samfund håndhæve et flyveforbud over den nordlige del af Syrien? | SD: Should the international community enforce a no-fly zone over northern Syria? |
50 | Bør verden gribe ind for at stoppe Assads luftstyrker? | Should the world intervene to take out Assad's forces from the skies? |
51 | Kilo: Men jeg tror ikke, vi har brug for det. Det syriske folk har i de sidste to år bevist, at de kan forsvare deres hjem uden ekstern indblanding og er støttet af den mindst mulige mængde af våben nødvendig for sejr. | Kilo: But I do not think we need it. The Syrian people have proved over the past two years that they can [defend] their homes without external interference and are supported by the minimum of weapons needed for victory. |
52 | De er ikke længere afhængige af udlandet for at opnå deres frihed. | They no longer depend on foreign countries to get their freedom. |
53 | De tror på, at de vestlige lande ikke ønsker Assads afgang, men at han forbliver, indtil han har ødelagt hele samfundet, og det der holder det sammen. | They believe that Western countries don't want Assad to leave, and that he'll stay until he destroys the whole society and what holds it together. |